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III. OF THE POWER OF COURTS AT COMMON LAW TO PUNISH
CONTEMPTS.
1. What court possess this power.
ALL courts have power to punish by fine and imprisonment
contempts committed in their presence: Bex v. Almon, Wilmot's
Notes 243. The power is inherent in all courts: In re looper,
32 Vt. 253; State v. Woodfin, 5 Ired. 199; 4 Stephens's Com.
342. A court is a place wherein justice is judicially administered:
3 Blk. 23. It signifies also in legal parlance the judges or magis-
trates who therein administer justice, while so acting, and includes
many magistrates and others acting in judicial capacities not
usually so designated, such as the mayor of a city, justices of the
peace while in execution of their office, the sheriff, when holding
his court, the sheriff's tourn: 2 Hawk. P. C. 93, § 15; Regina
v. Lefroy, 8 Q. B. 134; 4 Moak 250; Sparks v. Martyn,
Ventris 1. While this is true of all courts, "whether of record or
not," (Rex v. Almon, supra), it is especially so as to the courts of
Westminster Hall and the superior courts in this country, which
moreover possess in addition the power of issuing attachments for
contempts, whether direct or constructive, not in facie curiae.
This distinction between the powers of superior and inferior courts
will be dwelt on more at large hereafter in the discussion as to the
nature and extent of this power: 4 Blk. 283; Bex v. Almon,
Wilmot's Notes 243 (1765); Besp. v. Oswald, 1 Dall. 319; Mid
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dlebrook v. State, 48 Conn. 257 (1876); Cartrigzt's Case, 114
Mass. 230, citing Clark's Praxis 62 (67); Acta Canc. 209, 264, &c.
The power to punish contempt in a summary manner is incident
to courts of law and equity. See the cases in United States Dig.,
Contempt, pl. 6.
,The courts of the United States have power to punish for con-
tempt, not immediately derived from statute, but necessarily result-
ing from the nature of their institution: United States v. Hudson,
et al., 7 Cr. 82, 84 (1812). This power exists under the consi-
tution, not being taken away by the provisions respecting trial by
jury: Hollingsworth v. .Duane, Wall. 77, 106.
The Judiciary Act of 1789, sect. 17, gave to the courts of the
United States power "to punish by fine and imprisonment, at the
discretion of the court, all contempts of their authority." But
the Act of 2d March 1881 restricted this power. See Rev. Stat.
U. S., sect. 725; 1 Kent 380, note b. But a single London com-
missioner of bankruptcy, sitting alone, has not power to punish
for contempt under the act creating such commissioners, such
contempts being cognisable by the courts of review established by
the same act: Rex v. Faulkner, 2 Mon. & Ayr. Cases in Bank-
ruptcy 332, 339.
In a note in 1 Kent (830 n. b) it is said, speaking of this case,
"that the power of the courts to punish summarily for contempts
has lately been much restrained in England."
Nor, it would seem, has a judge sitting at chambers this power
till his order be made a rule of court; he has not in such capacity
the power of a court of record: Id. To the same effect, People v.
.Brennan, 45 Barb. 344. Contra, if there be an action pending in
the court in which the order, disobedience of which constituted the
contempt, was issued. And see Hilton v. Patterson, 10 Abb. Pr.
245.
It has been held that this power does not arise from the mero
exercise of judicial functions, and that the recorder of the city of
Hoboken had not such power, even in case of contempt, in faie
eurice: Matter of Kerrigan, 88 N. J. L. (4 Vroom) 344.
It seems that Congress cannot delegate to a commissioner, or
any other than a judicial officer, the power of summary committal
for contempt. "This was an exercise of the judicial power of the
United States, which under the constitution could not be intrusted
to an officer appointed and holding his office," as these commis
sioners do: CADWALADEFR, J., in Ex parte Doll, 7 Phila. 595.
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In Pennsylvania, commissioners, under rule of court, &c., to
take testimony, have by statute power to issue attachments for
defaulting witnesses: Purd. Dig. 622, pl. 2, 3.
This power also belongs to the Houses of Parliament, the Senate
and House of Representatives of the United States.
The power to punish extends to imprisonment for a period not
longer than the time of periodical adjournment or dissolution of
such bodies: Beg. v. Paty, 2 Ld. Raym. 1105; Ex parte Nugent,
Am. L. J. (N. S.) 107; Crosby's Case, 3 Wilson 204.
Under English law, this power of the Houses of Parliament
seems to be exercised in a twofold capacity, as legislative bodies by
prescription, as judicial bodies in their own right. See Ex parte
Brown, 117 E. C. L. R. 280 (1864), where the Court of Queen's
Bench held that the House of Kegs, the legislative body of the
Isle of Man, as such had neither inherently nor by statute the
power of committing for contempt: Id., pp. 289, 293. In Doyle
v. Falconer, Law Rep., 1 P. C. 328 (1866), it was declared that
the Legislative Assembly of Dominica does not possess the power
of punishing a contempt. though committed in its presence by one
of its members. Such authority has not been expressly granted,
and does not belong to a colonial House of Assembly by analogy
to the lex et consuetudo Parlianenti, which is a law peculiar to
and inherent in the two Houses of Parliament in the United
Kingdom. Nor is there any resemblance between a court of justice,
which is a court of record, and a colonial House of Assembly, which
is a body having no judicial functions, and can lay no claim to the
inherent power of punishing contempt possessed by courts of jus-
tice. The Privy Council declared that the cases cited established
conclusively that "the legislative assemblies in the British colonies
have, in the absence of express grant, no power to adjudicate
upon, or punish for, contempts committed beyond their walls ;"
and further, that "the power to puish and commit for contempt
committed in its presence," is not necessary to the existence of
such a body as the Assembly of Dominica, and the proper exercise
of the functions which it is intended to execute. The council
distinguished between the judicial power to punish for contempt,
and the power necessary to self-preservation of removing obstruc-
tions to the action of a legislative body when sitting.
The opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheaton 204, was mentioned as sustaining
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an opposite view, with which a previous decision in the Privy
Council, since overruled, was in accord: viz., that the power of
punishing contempts, whether direct or indirect, is inherent in
every supreme legislative body. There was, however, no doubt as
to the case under consideration, that "the warrants having been
issued by virtue of an alleged authority, which if it existed was
confessedly a limited one, ought to have shown on the face of them
that the alleged contempt was committed in the presence of the
House, and so fell within the limits of that authority."
This was an action for false imprisonment, and the action of the
Speaker of the House and the members, was held not justified.
The contempt was a very gross one, committed in the presence of
the House.
2. The origin of the power.
For any clearly ascertained and definite source of this power in
the common law', or in any decision or enactment giving rise to it,
though it has been mentioned in modern times in various acts of
Parliament (see 13 Car. II., c. 2, s. 2; 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Win. IV., c.
36; 2 & 3 Wm. IV., c. 50; 23 & 24 Viet., c. 149 ; 40 & 41 Id., c.
21, sects. 40, 41, &c.) we may look in vain. Nor can we ascer-
tain when it first arose; we fixd it actually exercised as early as
the annals of our law extend: 4 Blk. 286. " It is as ancient as
any other part of the common law :" WILMOT, J., in B.ex v.
Almon, Wilmot's Notes 243, 254; s. c. 5 Burr. 2686; Resp.
v. Oswald, 1 Dall. 326. See also, 13 Car. II., c. 2, s. 2.
The power to protect themselves from insult, to enforce their
authority, to repress disorder, and in such cases to punish offenders,
is a necessary attribute of every court. "Without this power no
court could possibly exist :" McKEAN, 0. J., in Besp. v. Oswald,
1 Dali. 829 (1788). It is a power necessarily implied from the
nature of a court of justice, as being "necessary to the exercise of'
all others :" United States v. Hudson et al., 7 Cr. 32-4; United
States v. N'ew Bedford Bridge, 1 Wood. & M. 401.
As regards the courts of Westminster Hall, their power in this
respect is "coeval with their first foundation and institution :"
WILMOT, J., supra. Although it is suggested in Gilb. Hist. C.
P., oh. 3 (cited as authority for this opinion in Vin. Abr., Contempt,
B 2) that this process may be derived from the Statute of West.-
minster 11., 13 Edw. I., c. 39, he seems to conclude "that it is a
part of the laws of the land, and confirmed by Magna Charta,
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which is decidedly the opinion of both Blackstone and Judge
WILMOT, supra. See, also, Bac. Abr., Attachment, 462; Salk.
84; Str. 185, 564. It is a part of the "laws of the land," within
the meaning of art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights, in Massa-
chusetts. See Cartwright's Case, 114 Mass. 23; see, also, Mid-
dlebrook v. State, 43 Conn. 267. It has been held, that this
power is "independent of the common law or statutory provisions
in regard to contempt," so far as respects the control of the court
over its attorneys: Ex parte Biggs, 64 N. C. 202.
3. The nature and extent of the power to punishfor contempt, at
common law.
As before stated, all courts, from the inherent necessities of the
case, possess this power in some degree; but to what degree,
whether a limited or the fullest, and how possessed, whether inde-
pendently of all other authority or subject to revision and control,
we have now to consider.
In discussing what courts possess this power mention was made
of the distinction betweon superior and inferior courts; under the
present head this distinction is still more important, as furnishing
a governing principle of discrimination which, with some excep-
tions, is generally applicable.
As regards the nature and extent of their powers, all courts are
divided into:
(1.) Superior courts, which possess full power to punish contempts
of all kinds, and whose proceedings are not subject to the super-
vision and control of any other courts.
(2.) Inferior courts, whose power to punish contempts is limited,
and whose proceedings are subject to the supervision and control
of the higher courts.
(1.) Superior courts are, in England, the Courts of Westminster
Hall, especially the Court of King's Bench, also the Courts of
Common Pleas, Exchequer and Chancery, the Assize Courts, held
by judges of the Courts of Westminster Hall, who, in this capa-
city, "represent the next ancient and honorable of all the judges,
the justices itinerant, or justices in eire" (WILLES, J., in Ex parte
Fernandez, 100 E. C. L. R. 40), Courts of Nisi Prius, General
Gaol Delivery, Oyer and Terminer, and of the Counties Palatine,
the Royal Court of Jersey. Certain of the Ecclesiastical Courts
seem to have occupied an uncertain position: Ricketts v. Boden-
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ham, 81 E. C. L. R. 107; they were not courts of record: 8 Blk.
67; Com. Dig., Courts, N 1.
In the United States this class includes all the federal courts,
all supreme courts, courts of appeal, courts of last resort, whether
at law or in equity, courts of equity or chancery, courts of com-
mon pleas, all which are courts of general jurisdiction, may be
denominated "supreme courts of justice" (4 Elk. 286), are courts
of record, and in England, the king's courts: 8 Blk. 24, 29, 59;
4 Id. 270, 271, n. 11; Hall's Am. Crim. Law 85, 36; -Ex parte
Jcrnandez, supra; Carus Wilson's Case, 53 E. C. L. R. 988;
Turner v. Bank, 4 Dall. 11; Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 205;
Williamson's Case, 26 Penn. St. 23, 26; McLaughlin's Case,
5 W. & S. 273.
Yet a superior court is not of necessity a court of record, at
least in England, although it seems to be considered the criterion
in 2 Hawk. P. C. 168; there are several of the king's courts not
of record, as the Court of Equity in Chancery, the Admiralty
Courts, &c. : 8 Elk. 24, n. 2 ; Vent. 1. "As the statute of the
27 Hen. VIII. says, there is as much difference between the king's
ministry of justice in his superior courts and his inferior courts, as
between being governed by the king in person and by his deputy :"
Cross v. Smith, 1 Salk. 148.
In the United States, there are some courts, which, though of
special and limited jurisdiction, still belong, in fact, to this class
of courts. Though sometimes designated in the constitution or
statutes creating them as inferior courts, they are so only relatively
and not in the common-law sense of the term. Such are the
United States Circuit and District Courts: -Ex parte Watkins, 3
Pet. 205; 4 Wash. C. C. 211; whose judgments, although erro-
neous, if the jurisdiction do not appear on the face of their pro-
ceedings, and for that reason reversible on writ of error or appeal,
are till then only voidable not void, and are not to be questioned
in a collateral proceeding; McCormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheat.
192; Wood v. Mann, 1 Sumn. 580; Thompson v. Lyle, 8 W.
& S. 166 ; Chemung Bank v. Judson, 4 Seld. 254. See, also,
Beaubien v. Brikekerhoff, 2 Scammon 269; Meyer v. fKalkman,
6 Cal. 582. To determine their rank, reference must, of course,
be had to the terms of the instrument by which they are created.
They are not necessarily of an inferior order: McoKenzie v. 11am-
say, 1 Bailey (So. C.) 457; Turner v. Bank, 4 Dall. 11.
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(2.) Inferior courts, or more properly, courts of an " inferior
order" (In re Fernandez, supra 40) are usually not of record.
Some are (or rather were) private, some are public courts. An
instance of a private court was the copyholder's court. In this
class of courts are reckoned the ancient court of pie poudre or
market court, which, however, was a court of record, the hundred
court, the county court, held by the sheriff (these two last were not
of record, yet the sheriff's tourn was); the coroner's court, the
court of quarter sessions, the court leet, all courts of record. These
are courts of "partial jurisdiction," and certain of. them are now,
and have long been, obsolete: 3 Blk. 37, 35 n. 3; 4 Id. 274.
With these may also be classed certain local courts, such as mayor's
courts, borough courts, &c., not necessary to be enumerated: 2
Blk. 24, 25, 32-5, 37; 4 Id. 273, 274; Strange 392, 449, 567,
794; Salk. 200-3, 650; Com. Dig., Courts, P; Bacon's Abr.,
Courts, D; Justice of Peace, E.
All courts of common law that have power to fine and imprison
are courts of record : 2 Hawk. c. 1, sect. 14. So all jurisdictions
erected with this power: Salk. 200. A justice of the peace is a
judge of record: Bac. Abr., Justice of Peace, E.
Among inferior courts now abolished (see statute 12 & 13 Vict.,
c. 101, sect. 13) were those of the Marshalsea, of the palace, and
her Majesty's "court of record for the honor of Peveril."
This designation will embrace many statutory courts which have
only the powers bestowed on them by the statutes creating them,
such as the new county courts in England: 4 Stephens's Com.
342 n. g; stat. 9 & 10 Vict., c. 95, s. 113; 1 Chitty's Statutes
1208.
Others are constituted by statute with the powers and privileges
of superior courts, as the Court of Review in Bankruptcy: Begina
v. Lefroy, L. R., 8 Q. B. 134; 4 Moak 250; Van Sandau v.
Turner, 6 Ad. & E. (N. S.) 784; Meyer v. Kalkman, 6 Cal. 582.
In connection with this point are worth noting Chief Justice
MARSHALL'S remarks in Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cr. 93, cited in
United States v. ew Bedford Bridge, 1 W. & M. 436: "Courts
which originate in the common law possess a jurisdiction which
must be regulated by the common law until some statute may
change their established principles; but courts which are created
by written law, and whose jurisdiction is defined by written law,
cannot transcend that jurisdiction."
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Inferior Courts in the United States.
In the United States the term "inferior court" is seldom
employed in the English sense of the term, as designating a court
of an "inferior order ;" it usually means only a subordinate court,
(MeLaughlin v. District burt, 5 W. & S. 273), from which an
appeal lies, and which is therefore relatively inferior. This differ-
ence must be borne in mind in construing the American decisions.
"Inferior courts," "in the technical sense of those words," are
defined by Chief Justice MARSHALL, in Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet.
205, as "courts of special and limited jurisdiction, which are
erected on such principles that their judgments taken alone are
entirely disregarded, and the proceedings must show their juris-
diction." Their judgments may be questioned collaterally, and do
not stand on the same ground with those of a court of record.
But they are not necessarily inferior because of special and limited
jurisdiction, as has been shown supra.
The decisive test in the United States, which distinguishes
superior and inferior courts in the common-law sense of the terms,
is that the former are courts of record while the latter are not:
-Ex parte Watkins, supra 209; Den, &c., v. Turner, 9 Wheat.
.541; In re Cooper, 32 Vt. 253; Van Valkenbur.q v. Evertson, 13
Wend. 76; Beaubien v. Brinckerhoff, 2 Scam. 272; Meyer v.
Kalkman, 6 Cal. 582; Nugent v. State, 18 Ala. 521; Thorn-
son v. Lyle, 3 W. & S. 166. Courts of justices of the peace and
other similar magistrates are usually of this class.
The courts of general sessions of the peace, held by all the
justices in a county, belonged to this category in New York,
before the adoption of the present code, and so the county Courts
of Common Pleas of that state at the same period, which were
declared to be not like the English Courts of Common Pleas: Peo-
ple v. Justices of Delaware County, 1 Johns. Cas. 181 (1799),
in which the characteristics of an inferior court are well set forth:
People v. Sessions of Ohenango, 2 Caines's Cas. 319 (1805);
Richmond v. Dayton, 10 Johns. 393; Van Valkenburgh v. -Evert-
uon, 13 Wend. 76. And as to New Jersey, see State v. Hunt,
Coxe 287 (1795); Kerrigan's Case, 33 N. J. 344 (1869).
In Pennsylvania a justice's court is an inferior court and not
of record. He has no common-law powers, and cannot punish
contempts, even committed before him, by summary proceeding:
Burginhofen v. Martin, 3 Yeates 479; Albright v. Lapp. 26
Penn. St. 99.
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And in Kansas it is an inferior court, and not of record: Woos-
ter v. McKinley, 1 Kansas 317. In Illinois it is "a court of
an inferior jurisdiction," with power to punish only contempts in
facie curiae : Clark v. People, Breese 266.
Its status seems much the same in Massachusetts: Albee v.
Ward, 8 Mass. 86 ; Smith v. 3forrison, 22 Pick. 430; in South
(arolina, State v. Applegate, 2 McCord 110; Harney v. Euggins,
.4 Bailey 267; in Georgia, Planters' Bank v. Chipley, Ga. Dec.
50; in Alabama, Ellis v. White, 25 Ala. 540; in Mississippi,
Stockett v. .Nicholson, 1 Miss. (Walk.) 75.
Though an inferior court and not of record, in Illinois, he can
fine for contempt and imprison for non-payment of the fine: Brown
v. People, 19 Ill. 613; Bowers v. Green, 1 Scam. 42; Tindall
v. .Aeeker, Id. 137; Robinson v. Harlan, Id. 237; Trader v.
MeKee, Id. 558 and note.
In New Hampshire, though an inferior court and not of record
having only statutory jurisdiction, his judgment will not be treated,
in a collateral proceeding or on habeas corpus, as a nullity, Nor
the merits of the question he decided be re-examined, as long as
he has not overstepped his jurisdiction : Burnham v. Stevens, 33
N. II. 256, 258; State v. Towle, 42 N. H. 540.
But they are courts of record and hold a higher rank, in Ver-
mont: in re Cooper, 32 Verm. 253; Ohio, Adair v. Rogers,
Wright 428; Indiana, Hooker v. State, 7 Blackf. 272.
In Texas, the question whether they are or are not courts of
record, is undetermined: Wahrenberger v. .foran, 18 Tex. 57.
Recent enactments in some of the above states may have altered
the law but the point does not seem to require further examination
here.
A probate court is an inferior court in Massachusetts: Smith v.
Rice, 11 Mass. 507 ; Chase v. Hathaway, 14 Id. 222. And so
it seems the county courts, formerly held by justices of the peace,
in Virginia; Stokeley v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. Cas. 330 (1812).
The Surrogate's Court in New York is not a court of record.
.3fatter of Watson, 3 Lans. 408.
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